Dual Use, Double Risk: The Tightening of International Research Collaboration in Norway
Research institutions are navigating an increasingly complex landscape when it comes to international collaboration. As the line between civilian and military applications blurs, «dual-use» technologies have come under strict scrutiny. Driven by geopolitical tensions and national security concerns, institutions are establishing firmer controls, with some considering outright bans on partnering with researchers from «red-listed» countries.
Toshiba-Kongsberg Case (1987)
Norway’s foundational modern export control framework was heavily shaped by the late-1980s Kongsberg våpenfabrikk scandal, where advanced multi-axis milling machines were illicitly exported to the Soviet Union, severely compromising Western submarine acoustic tracking security. Though handled largely as a massive political, corporate, and regulatory turning point rather than a standalone contemporary prosecution of this scale, it permanently anchored strict export laws in Norway.
The NTNU Case: A Cautionary Tale
The case of a German-Iranian professor at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU) highlights the severe personal and institutional consequences of these tightened controls. In 2019, the professor invited four Iranian guest researchers to his lab. The guests were given access to a scanning electron microscope (SEM).
While SEMs have been commercially available since the 1960s, Norwegian law classifies them as dual-use technology because they can be used to study materials relevant to nuclear weapons development. The professor was charged with violating export control rules for failing to obtain a license. Although initially convicted and sentenced to eight months in prison, he was later fully acquitted on appeal. The appellate court found that the use of the SEM fell under exemptions for basic research and information already in the public domain.
Despite the acquittal, the case had a profound impact. It ended the professor’s academic career and led NTNU to implement strict new security protocols.
Formalizing Risk Assessment
In response to these events and the broader regulatory climate, institutions developed clearer guidelines. NTNU now requires researchers to actively assess export control and security risks, using specific forms to identify risks related to partners, export control, and international sanctions.
Key aspects that must be considered include:
- National Security: Whether research could impact Norway’s fundamental security interests, such as critical infrastructure or defense capabilities.
- International Sanctions: Whether collaboration involves sanctioned countries or institutions.
- Export Control: Whether the project utilizes dual-use technology that could require government licensing to share internationally.
But one thing is hardware – what about the publication of an article that teaches something that is export controlled, i.e. export of knowledge?
The 2025 Regulatory Overhaul and DEKSA Guidelines
Recognizing that universities needed more predictable frameworks, the Norwegian Government introduced significant amendments to the export control regulations in late 2025, citing a «new and more serious threat landscape.»
A key conceptual shift in the updated regulations is the replacement of the broad term «knowledge transfer» with the more precise «technology transfer.» To balance national security with the need for academic freedom, the government explicitly codified exemptions from licensing requirements for basic research and for technology transfers occurring within Norway to citizens of EU, EEA, and NATO countries.
Simultaneously, the Directorate of Export Control and Sanctions (DEKSA) issued targeted guidelines for the higher education sector. Universities are now required to exercise «special vigilance» when admitting foreign students or hiring researchers in sensitive fields at the master’s and PhD levels. Disciplines under intense scrutiny include life sciences (biotechnology), chemistry, nuclear physics, and aerospace technology, due to their potential application in the development of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) or their delivery systems. Furthermore, specialized sanctions completely prohibit the admission of North Korean students to these WMD-relevant fields.
The Ripple Effect: Broadening Interventions
The heightened focus on national security is not limited to academic research; it extends to foreign direct investment (FDI). In 2021, the Norwegian Government blocked the sale of Bergen Engines, a Rolls-Royce subsidiary, to a Russian-controlled buyer.
Crucially, this transaction did not trigger a mandatory filing under standard rules. However, the Norwegian Government possesses broad, sector-agnostic powers to intervene against any transaction that poses a «not insignificant risk» to national security. The veto was based on concerns that Russia would gain access to strategically important know-how and technology.
Balancing Security and Scientific Progress
The convergence of dual-use regulations and broad national security powers creates significant friction for international engagement. The fear of prosecuting missteps has led to what some call «hyper-enforcement» by university administrators. Bureaucratic hurdles, such as prolonged waits for export licenses, actively discourage hiring researchers from «red-listed» countries like China. Indeed, some research centres have ceased all hiring from Iran, China, and Russia entirely. Applying for an export license to hire a Chinese researcher, can lead to paperwork being held up interminably, threatening the funding of a project. Who can risk that? Good researchers will get tired of waiting and find another job in the meantime.
Not to mention the many pitfalls one may encounter in international collaboration. What if information passed from Norway to a collaborating team that includes researchers from a sanctioned state? – as we know from the Kongsberg case mentioned above, Norway has even stricter export laws than many other European states.
What about Intellectual Property (IP)?
For companies developing dual-use technologies, managing IP requires a delicate balance between securing commercial patents, protecting state secrets, and attracting investors.
Key IP considerations include:
- Asset Tracking: Identify and track core IP assets (systems, algorithms, source code) and perform freedom to operate (FTO) analyses.
- Contractual Safeguards: Ensure all collaboration and licensing agreements contain comprehensive IP clauses addressing ownership and dissemination restrictions.
- Export Restrictions: Assess whether your patent filings or cross-border tech developments require an export license before sharing data internationally.
Summary
While protecting national security is paramount, the current paradigm risks casting all research as suspect. The 2025 updates to Norwegian export regulations and DEKSA guidelines represent a critical attempt to introduce clarity—protecting critical assets and deterring WMD proliferation without entirely stifling the open scientific collaboration that drives global progress. Striking this balance will remain a defining challenge for Norwegian institutions in the years to come.
